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HAUERWAS AND THE LAW:  
FRAMING A PRODUCTIVE 
CONVERSATION 
CATHLEEN KAVENY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The title of this symposium is “Theological Argument in Law: Engaging 
with Stanley Hauerwas.” When I discussed the project with colleagues 
specializing in Christian theological ethics, they were interested, even intrigued. 
Truth be told, however, they were also rather skeptical. 
Why the skepticism? It is universally acknowledged that Hauerwas is both 
engaged and engaging, actively involved in wide-ranging conversations with 
academics, pastors, doctors, and—yes—even lawyers. Furthermore, no one 
would deny that arguments rooted in the Christian theological tradition have 
made their way into American law over the years. Indeed, in 1892, a Supreme 
Court opinion unselfconsciously proclaimed that “this is a Christian nation.”1 
“A Christian nation”? Ah-ha! Many Christian theologians would say there is 
the problem in a nutshell. Throughout his career, Stanley Hauerwas has 
tirelessly protested all efforts to embed Christianity, as either an intellectual 
system or social group, into the framework of worldly power. Such efforts, in his 
view, inevitably corrupt the thought and the practices of Christians, twisting 
both toward the goal of sustaining the kingdoms of this world, rather than 
building the kingdom of God that was inaugurated by the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Unlike the “peaceable kingdom” of Jesus, earthly 
kingdoms are inherently built on violence—not only the violence of warfare, 
but also the threats of coercive force that ultimately and undeniably back any 
system of positive law.2 The law, in other words, describes and implements the 
operating system of the strikingly unpeaceable secular world. Upon what basis 
could Hauerwas possibly engage it? 
Like lawyers, theologians are not generally content to raise only one 
objection to a project or proposal. Those schooled in divinity would also point 
 
Copyright © 2012 by Cathleen Kaveny. 
 This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
   John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology, University of 
Notre Dame. 
 1.  Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
 2.  See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS (1983). 
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out that Hauerwas has vociferously articulated additional concerns about 
Christian involvement in the particular type of secular polity the United States 
has become since 1892—a modern liberal democracy. Hauerwas maintains that 
the United States has generated a political discussion that presses all citizens to 
adopt a first-order moral and political framework that is meant to be neutral 
among competing worldviews, and then calls upon them to recast their 
particular religious beliefs in terms of that neutral framework when they enter 
the public square. According to Hauerwas, playing this game saps Christians of 
the confidence they need to proclaim the good news of the Gospel to all nations 
in their own, distinctive first-order language. They need to remember that the 
main purpose of the Christian community is to witness to the distinctive story of 
God’s salvific intervention in history through Jesus Christ. Ultimately—
Hauerwas insists—the Christian story judges, it is not judged by, secular 
standards of epistemology and ethics. To hold otherwise is to sell both the 
Christian community and the world itself short, for the Christian message is true 
for the world too, though it knows it not. 
So the issue many Christian theologians would raise about this symposium is 
this: Is there a way in which the type of theology Stanley Hauerwas finds 
congenial can engage American law? I would like to explore this question in 
this essay. More specifically, my plan is as follows: Drawing primarily upon 
Hauerwas’s Gifford Lectures, part II will explicate his view of the nature and 
purpose of Christian theology, as well as the dangers he believes it to face in the 
contemporary American context. The purpose of this section is to clarify the 
theological challenges any adequate Hauerwasian engagement with the 
American legal system will need to meet. 
Taking into account these clarifications, part III will sketch a normative 
framework for the engagement of theology with the secular law that Hauerwas 
would, I hope, recognize as legitimate. The centerpiece of this framework is 
Karl Barth’s account of the relationship of covenant and creation, and the 
possibilities for ad hoc engagement of theology and secular disciplines that it 
enables, according to the perceptive interpretations of Barth offered by Hans 
Frei and William Werphehowski. 
In part IV, I will turn from broader issues of theological method to more 
particular questions of the relationship of theological ethics to law. I will draw 
upon Paul Ramsey’s engagement with the thought of Jacques Maritain and 
Edmond Cahn to suggest that the common-law tradition, in which legal and 
moral norms are articulated and applied in the context of concrete cases, can 
provide a fruitful basis for conversation between theology done in a 
Hauerwasian way and the secular legal system. Hauerwas is often called a 
narrative theologian, precisely because he resists treating moral norms in 
isolation from character, narrative, and tradition. For this reason, he has a 
natural conversation partner in the common law. The common law, however, is 
a vast domain. Where should the conversation begin? I will suggest that 
contract law—the body of statutes and cases dealing with making and enforcing 
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promises—might serve as a natural starting point, given the historical and 
normative overlap between the notions of “covenant” and “contract.” 
My own theological framework is somewhat different from Hauerwas’s. I 
approach questions of political theology from the Roman Catholic tradition, 
which tends to recognize more continuities between nature and grace, and 
therefore more possibilities for natural theology and natural ethics (sometimes 
called natural law) than Hauerwas ordinarily acknowledges. In what follows 
below, I am writing, so to speak, as Hauerwas’s theological lawyer and 
advocate, not in my own name. Putting myself in his shoes, I am attempting to 
develop a position justifying Christian engagement with the secular law that is 
consistent with his fundamental theological premises, which are not in every 
case my own. Why engage in such an exercise? Because grappling closely with 
Hauerwas’s perspectives on the relationship of the church to the world is a 
fruitful exercise for Christians of all stripes. Moreover, it is a mistake to avoid 
the challenges his work poses to competing strands of Christian political 
thought by dismissing him as a “sectarian” whose perspective has no real point 
of contact with political life in a broader, pluralistic society. Before Christians of 
other viewpoints can responsibly engage a Hauerwasian vision of the 
relationship of theology and law, we need to work out his position as carefully 
and sympathetically as possible. That is the goal of this article. 
II 
WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE:  
HAUERWAS ON THEOLOGY, CHURCH, AND WORLD 
Stanley Hauerwas is a staggeringly prolific writer. As the essay titles in this 
symposium issue testify, he has offered perceptive reflections on a range of key 
topics at the intersection of theology and ethics. In part because so much of his 
writing has taken the form of occasional essays, it can be difficult to formulate 
an accurate and comprehensive account of his overall approach to theology, 
ethics, and contemporary culture. My own strategy will be to draw upon his 
Gifford Lectures, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and 
Natural Theology,3 in constructing such an account because it offers his most 
extensive account of the relationship of the church and the world. 
Like most of his work, With the Grain of the Universe is dialogical; 
Hauerwas develops his own views about the proper relationship of Christian 
theology to broader secular philosophical and political currents in conversation 
with three prior Gifford lecturers: William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl 
Barth. James, Niebuhr, and Barth, of course, were and remain key figures in 
their own right. Barack Obama’s well-publicized admiration for Niebuhr has 
influenced his decision-making regarding both foreign and domestic policy.4 
 
 3.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S WITNESS AND 
NATURAL THEOLOGY (2001). 
 4.  John Blake, How Obama’s Favorite Theologian Shaped his First Year in Office, CNN POLITICS 
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Although it is certainly worthwhile to consider whether Hauerwas’s 
interpretation of their writings is accurate, let me emphasize that doing so is 
beyond the scope of this project. My goal is to glean Hauerwas’s position, as he 
articulates it in conversation with them, in order to build a platform for 
engaging the law from there. My aim is not to defend James, Niebuhr, or Barth 
against any purported misinterpretations of them by Hauerwas. 
What, then, is Hauerwas’s argument in With the Grain of the Universe? 
Centrally, he contends that the project of the Gifford lectures—to develop a 
natural theology, an understanding of God, humanity, and morality that is 
defensible and intelligible on grounds fully independent from the complete and 
vigorous account of reality offered by Christianity—is a serious mistake. 
Hauerwas thinks it is wrongheaded for anyone to try to develop a natural 
theology, because he is convinced that the goal of producing a context-free 
foundation for knowledge, or a context-independent account of morality, is 
thoroughly misguided. Moreover, he believes it is a terrible misfire for 
Christians to pursue this strategy because the epistemological and moral power 
of their tradition is inextricably entwined with the very particular story of God’s 
intervention in history contained in the Bible. In short, Hauerwas thinks 
Christians who go the way of natural theology are selling their birthright for a 
mess of pottage. 
A.   William James 
Hauerwas devotes the first two chapters of his book to William James, 
concentrating centrally but not exclusively upon the views James developed in 
his own Gifford Lectures, which became The Varieties of Religious Experience.5 
He takes James to represent both the harbinger and the parent of modern 
secular liberal democratic thought with regard to Christianity. Hauerwas argues 
that James’s work was infused with an ulterior political purpose: to reshape 
religion in general and Christianity in particular to support the emerging liberal, 
democratic polis in the United States and elsewhere. He charges that James 
“thinks democracy is not just a social and political arrangement but the very 
character of the emerging universe.”6 According to Hauerwas, Christianity 
threatened to impede what James saw as cosmic progress: 
What really bothered James was not that Christianity seemed to entail false views 
about the world, but that Christianity challenged the moral and political arrangements 
necessary to sustain the human project without God. James was profoundly right to 
see Christianity as the enemy of the world he hoped was being born. That James’s 
world has come into being, a world about which he had some misgivings, makes it all 
the more important to attend to this aspect of his thought. Many Christians today want 
 
(Feb. 5, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-05/politics/Obama.theologian_1_reinhold-niebuhr-
president-obama-pastor?; see also David Gibson, Of Niebuhr and Nobels: Divining Obama’s Theology, 
POLITICS DAILY (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/12/12/of-niebuhr-and-nobels-
divining-obamas-theology. 
 5.  WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (1902). 
 6.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 80. 
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the world James wanted, while assuming that they can continue to have the Christian 
God. But James was right to think that you cannot have both.”
7
 
To suit and serve the emerging democratic world, James attempted to soften 
and reframe the hard, distinctive claims of Christianity. In fact, Hauerwas 
charges that James virtually evacuated the religious content from Christianity, 
leaving only a shell containing a disguised humanism. 
More specifically, Hauerwas identifies three specific problems with James’s 
thought from a Christian perspective. First, influenced by Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, James frames religious belief as essentially a matter for individuals in 
their solitariness, rather than a communal matter. According to Hauerwas, this 
approach wrongly discounts the primacy of communities of believers as the 
context in which individuals learn the language and grammar of faith. 
Second, James separates religious feelings from convictions about religious 
truths, identifying the former with religious belief and discounting the latter. 
This separation, according to Hauerwas, wrongly suggests that the feelings are 
separable from the religious propositions that support them.8 In Hauerwas’s 
view, James’s account fails to do justice to the intellectual content of 
Christianity, and fails to highlight the degree to which religious affections are 
shaped by that content. 
Third, James fails to recognize the irreducible particularity of Christian 
claims, reconceptualizing Christianity as simply one example of the more 
common human phenomenon of “religion.” Hauerwas notes that for James, 
religions are characterized by their sets of “over-beliefs”—philosophical and 
theological formulas that cannot be proven and that are also not justified on the 
basis of James’s pragmatic theory of knowledge.9 Moreover—and this is key—
because over-beliefs are not pragmatically justified, they cannot serve as a basis 
for acting, or at least acting in ways that affect the interests of those who do not 
share the beliefs. Hauerwas opposes James on both counts. He rejects James’s 
claim that Christian beliefs are not pragmatically justified—justified, that is, by 
their place in a broad network of workable assertions about how the world 
operates. He also, therefore, repudiates the implication that Christian beliefs 
can have no bearing upon one’s actions in the public sphere of politics and 
public policy, but instead must be relegated to the realm of private interests and 
pursuits.10 
 
 7.  Id. at 78–79. 
 8.  Hauerwas claims that what matters for James in matters of religion is not intellectual beliefs, 
but “immediate and intuitive . . . assurance.” Id. at 71 (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, VARIETIES OF 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN NATURE 214 (Mentor Book 1958)). Hauerwas goes on 
to object that this position is inconsistent with James’s own pragmatism, which holds that “[t]he reasons 
why I find it satisfactory to believe that any idea is true, the how of my arriving at that belief, may be 
among the very reasons why the idea is true in reality.” Id. at 72 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 275 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996)). Hauerwas remarks, “It 
does not seem to occur to James that attending to the how of what it might mean to be forgiven is not 
separable from what Christians think God has done for the world in Christ.” Id. 
 9.  Id. at 68. 
 10.  “My concern at this point, however, is not why James thought he was justified to call his over-
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In a nutshell, Hauerwas argues that a central aim for William James was to 
resize Christianity to fit the nascent liberal democratic project, which can admit 
of no moral authority higher than human consensus. In Hauerwas’s view, 
James’s conceptual Procrustean bed would ultimately prove lethal to Christian 
belief and community. Hauerwas laments that not all Christians living then 
were able to see the effects of James’s views upon their communities of faith. 
Moreover, Hauerwas contends that Christians living in our own time are 
equally blind about the harm caused by James’s successors: the economists, 
philosophers, and public intellectuals who defend America’s emphasis on 
economic freedom in the era of globalized capitalism. I can only imagine what 
Hauerwas would say about the current fascination with Ayn Rand expressed by 
many leaders of the religious right, such as Glen Beck and Rush Limbaugh. 
That admiration is not limited to pundits; it is also shared by powerful 
legislators, such as Paul Ryan (R-Wis.), a practicing Roman Catholic who chairs 
the House Budget Committee.11 Moreover, I doubt that Hauerwas would be 
either sympathetic to or shocked by the hostility that conservative Catholic 
commentator George Weigel expressed regarding a recent document from the 
Vatican calling for the establishment of a global economic authority.12 
B.   Reinhold Niebuhr 
What would theology look like if it capitulated to the demands of James and 
his ilk to resize Christianity to fit comfortably within the epistemological and 
political constraints of liberal democracy? In order to answer this question, 
Hauerwas turns to Reinhold Niebuhr, arguably the towering figure of twentieth 
century American Protestantism. In Hauerwas’s estimation, Niebuhr’s 
normative commitments are uncomfortably close to James’s; he maintains that 
“Niebuhr’s Gifford lectures are but a Christianized version of James’s account 
of religious experience.”13 Moreover, like James, Hauerwas believes Niebuhr’s 
ultimate purpose was to reconfigure Christianity in a way that would be useful 
to prevailing American commitments to individualism and the exercise of 
national power in order to protect America’s ideological and economic 
interests. Hauerwas charges that “[t]he animating center of Niebuhr’s life and 
work was the crafting of an account of liberal Christianity acceptable to a liberal 
culture and politics.”14 
What, in Hauerwas’s view, was Niebuhr’s key methodological mistake? It 
was to relativize Christian claims about God’s way of acting in the world by 
 
belief ‘god.’ Rather, my concern is to understand why James thought that what Christians believe about 
Christ, the Trinity, or the church are over-beliefs that can have no pragmatic justification.” Id. at 71. 
 11.  See Stephen Prothero, You Can’t Reconcile Ayn Rand and Jesus, USA TODAY (June 5, 2011), 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2011-06-05-Ayn-Rand-and-Jesus-dont-
mix_n.htm (noting that Ryan cites Rand as “the reason” for his involvement in public service). 
 12.  George Weigel, The Pope, Chaplain to OWS? Rubbish, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/281140/pope-chaplain-ows-rubbish-george-weigel. 
 13.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 87. 
 14.  Id. at 88. 
07_KAVENY (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2012  3:59 PM 
No. 4 2012] FRAMING A PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATION 141 
treating them as metaphorical statements about more-fundamental, common 
human experiences and longings. By attempting to make Christianity more 
widely appealing and accessible, Niebuhr drained it of its distinctive content 
and power. Hauerwas charges that 
[f]or Niebuhr, Christ and the cross are not realities limited to the specific revelation 
found in Christianity; rather they are symbols of the tensions we must endure as 
people who expect history to be fulfilled, who expect a “Christ.” Just as sin describes 
our nature, so Christ and the cross describe our destiny.
15
 
For Hauerwas, Niebuhr treats Christianity as merely one instantiation of a 
common human phenomenon, which can be appreciated and understood apart 
from Christian claims, albeit maybe not as easily or as well. In the end, 
Hauerwas doubts “we have anything more in Niebuhr than a complex 
humanism disguised in the language of the Christian faith.”16 
Hauerwas acknowledges, of course, that most people do not think of 
Niebuhr as a liberal because of his emphasis on human sin in his ethical and 
political writings. Many previous Christian public intellectuals on the American 
scene, such as Walter Rauschenbusch, a key figure in the “Social Gospel 
Movement,” were far more optimistic about the capacity of human beings to 
improve their collective moral lot. Hauerwas responds by calling his readers’ 
attention to the distinction between theological liberalism and political 
liberalism. Niebuhr is a theological liberal, because the ultimate ground and test 
of his theological claims is human experience. Moreover, his political 
conservatism is firmly rooted in his theological liberalism; in Niebuhr’s view, 
common human experience shows that human beings cannot avoid the exercise 
of political responsibility, sometimes by exerting military force even in morally 
murky situations. It is futile and dangerous for nations to pursue or expect pure 
justice in their military endeavors. In most cases, relative justice is all that can 
be expected. For Hauerwas, the decisive weight that theological liberalism gives 
to common human experience supports a policy of war-making as the only 
“realistic” response to political and military threats. Hauerwas writes, 
Niebuhr’s ethics and his theology were of a piece. His theology sought to make 
Christian belief intelligible within the naturalistic presumptions that he thought were a 
prerequisite of modern science. His ethics sought to make Christian belief intelligible 
and even useful within the presuppositions of political liberalism. Theological liberals 
after Niebuhr often want his theology without his ethics; and political conservatives, 
like the “atheists for Niebuhr,” often want his ethics without his theology. Yet 
Niebuhr, I think, rightly saw that you cannot have one without the other.
17
 
Sorting through Hauerwas’s criticism of Niebuhr’s theological method is 
important here because it will help us avoid analogous methodological mistakes 
in constructing a Hauerwasian theological approach to American law. 
Hauerwas, for example, does not object to Niebuhr’s emphasis upon the 
pervasiveness of sin in human life. He strongly rejects, however, Niebuhr’s 
 
 15.  Id. at 127. 
 16.  Id. at 131. 
 17.  Id. at 137. 
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account of how sin can be perceived, identified, and defined. What is that 
account? Niebuhr’s fundamental methodological decision is to begin with 
general human experience, focusing upon the lived contradiction between 
finiteness and freedom, and then to identify that contradiction with the 
experience of original sin. From there, Niebuhr goes on to defend Christianity 
as the best way of understanding and responding to general human experience, 
even as he revises the content of Christianity in the process. In other words, 
Niebuhr first articulates a general human problem, and then proposes a 
Christian account of sin and redemption as both an explanation and a solution 
to that problem.18 
In Hauerwas’s judgment, then, the key flaw in Niebuhr’s strategy is its 
directionality: In fact, he would say that, from an epistemological perspective, 
Niebuhr’s approach is entirely backward. According to Hauerwas, persons must 
first be transformed by the redemptive story of the Bible before they can 
recognize sin as sin—as the breach in the relationship between God and 
humanity, between God and oneself, that Christ died to overcome. No 
twentieth-century theologian, in Hauerwas’s estimation, proclaimed this point 
more firmly than Karl Barth. 
C.   Karl Barth 
The chief achievement of Karl Barth, in Hauerwas’s estimation, is that he 
accurately grasped the proper directionality required to know the truth about 
“the nature and destiny of man” (to borrow from Niebuhr); it is a directionality 
that moves from church to world, rather than from world to church.19 In the 
order of the biblical narrative, sin precedes redemption. In the epistemological 
order, however, the reverse is true. Redemption precedes sin because we can 
know sin for what it is only if we know it from the vantage point provided by 
faithful witness to the redemptive activity of God. We are able to accurately 
interpret the beginning of the biblical narrative of salvation—the fall—only in 
light of the end—the resurrection of Jesus. Barth clearly proclaimed that 
Scripture is the primary source of knowledge about God and God’s relationship 
to humanity. He also recognized that Christians cannot learn to read Scripture 
on their own, but must learn to do so in the context of a believing and 
worshiping community—the church. Shaped by this ecclesiastically transmitted 
knowledge, Christians can then interpret the situation in the world correctly; for 
the story of Scripture actually applies to all people, although not everyone 
acknowledges it. 
 
 18.  “Thus Niebuhr’s account of original sin is his attempt to do natural theology. Christians may 
not be able to convince agnostics and nonbelievers that God exists, but Christians can convince 
nonbelievers that sin exists. Moreover, if sin exists, it makes some sense to think that God exists. 
Niebuhr’s project is to provide an account of the human condition that is so compelling that the more 
‘absurd’ aspects of ‘orthodox Christianity’—such as the beliefs that God exists and that God is love—
might also receive a hearing.” Id. at 120. 
 19.  Id. at 176. 
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Hauerwas emphasizes that the core message of Barth is simple; Barth 
himself summarized it as “Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells me 
so.”20 Why then did Barth write the fourteen immense volumes of the Church 
Dogmatics? That work is a mighty effort, Hauerwas would say, to reverse the 
powerful currents of theological liberalism, not only (or even primarily) by 
mounting a syllogistic argument against those currents, but by comprehensively 
modeling sound theological reflection. What might that be? According to 
Barth, practicing good theology is not an abstract academic exercise, but rather 
a practical endeavor in service of the church’s saving pedagogy. According to 
Hauerwas, “[t]he Church Dogmatics, with its unending and confident display of 
Christian speech, is Barth’s attempt to train us to be a people capable of 
truthful witness to the God who alone is the truth.”21 Faithful witness—
Hauerwas’s understanding of the central Christian activity—requires 
transformation of the speaker, not only the speech. Barth trains Christians to 
see correctly by building up, through sheer volume and repetition, a rich 
account of how the church and world look from the confident perspective of 
those who believe in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Despite its length, Hauerwas argues that Barth’s Church Dogmatics is not 
rightly considered systematic theology—an exhaustive account and orderly 
arrangement of true propositions about God and humanity from the Christian 
perspective. Hauerwas thinks this is a virtue, not a vice of the work. Theology is 
not a desiccated academic topos, but the free response of a believer to the 
claims of the living God. One problem with systematic theology, from his view, 
is that it wrongly constricts the believer’s response; another is that it futilely 
attempts to chain God down to a preconceived organizational or philosophical 
structure. Furthermore, precisely because theology is properly construed as a 
written reflection of an ongoing relationship between God and His people, 
theology can have no formal beginning or end in the way systematic accounts of 
any merely academic subject necessarily have. 
For Barth, theology’s natural structure is narrative, reflecting the narrative 
structure of the Biblical account of creation, sin, and redemption through the 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. Theology is properly seen as 
an ongoing attempt to retell the Biblical story of God and humanity from 
various angles and perspectives: 
“Who and what Jesus Christ is, is something which can only be told, not a system 
which can be considered and described.” The gospel, according to Barth, is just that 
simple, but because it is just that simple it requires a complex telling, since we are 
telling a story about the beginning of all beginnings whose end has come and yet is still 
to come.
22
 
 
 
 20.  Id. at 182 (quoting Martin Rumscheidt, Epilogue to KARL BARTH, FRAGMENTS GRAVE AND 
GAY (Eric Mosbacher trans., 1971)). 
 21.  Id. at 176. 
 22.  Id. at 180 (quoting 2 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 2, at 188 (G.W. Bromiley & 
T.F. Torrance trans., 1957)). 
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Accordingly, Barth’s métier is not syllogistic argument, as both Hauerwas and 
Hans Frei23 have noted. Hauerwas, however, points out something that Frei did 
not grasp: Not all argument, understood loosely as persuasive speech, takes the 
forms of syllogistic argument. According to Hauerwas, “as Barth uses it, the 
language of the church is itself already an argument just to the extent that his 
descriptions and redescriptions cannot help but challenge our normal way of 
seeing the world.”24 Here, I think, is a strong point of contact between Hauerwas 
and the common law. The “facts” of the case both in lawyers’ briefs and in court 
opinions are not neutral. Some elements are highlighted, whereas others are 
downplayed. If a brief or opinion is well written, the narrative of the 
controversy naturally suggests that the action the narrator asks of the audience 
is the next logical and suitable step in the story. The gravitational force of a 
plaintiff’s lawyer in a closing argument in a tort case can push the jury toward 
awarding generous damages to compensate the plaintiff for the wrong he 
suffered. The gravitational force of the facts presented in an appellate opinion 
can prompt the legal community toward accepting the decision as a sound 
specification of the requirements of justice. Hauerwas and Barth would say that 
the gravitational force in the biblical narratives pushes believers toward 
repentance, gratitude, and witness to the power of God’s mercy. 
In the Reformed tradition out of which Karl Barth writes, gratitude is the 
first and proper response of the Christian who realizes that he is forgiven 
because Christ died and rose again. Other good works, the works of 
sanctification, are concrete signs of our gratitude and joy at our redemption. 
For Hauerwas, 
[o]ur participation in God’s revelation consists in our offering thanks; such is the very 
condition of our speaking truthfully about God and ourselves. In every aspect of our 
lives, we cannot try to be anything other than a grateful response to God’s revelation. 
As Barth says: “The work of the knowledge of God as man’s participation in the 
veracity of the revelation of God certainly involves a witness, a question and a 
summons to all other works. But it takes place as such, as human work, with the same 
unpretentiousness with which they must take place, and alone can take place as good 
works.”
25
 
For both Barth and Hauerwas, truthful witness to the story of redemption is 
the central element of Christian ethics. Neither thinks that this witness will be 
easily accepted—even the joyful, non-coercive testimony that Barth thinks will 
be a fruit of God’s gracious movement of the human heart. Barth maintains that 
a true Christian will be considered by the world to be “a strangely human 
person.”26 Perhaps too vividly, Barth suggests (and Hauerwas agrees) that 
“what the ‘world perceives when it hears the witness of the Christian is the 
 
 23.  See generally HANS W. FREI, TYPES OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY (George Hunsinger & William 
C. Placher eds., 1992). 
 24.  HAUERWAS, supra note 3, at 182. 
 25.  Id. at 191 (quoting 2 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 1, at 216 (G.W. Bromiley & 
T.F. Torrance trans., 1957)). 
 26.  Id. at 196 (quoting KARL BARTH, THE CHRISTIAN LIFE: LETTER FRAGMENTS 203–04 
(Geoffrey Bromiley trans., 1981)). 
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opinion of a fanatic who has obviously broken his bridges and burned his boats 
behind him and demands that it should do the same.’”27 
Why bother, then? Why should Christians witness to those who scorn their 
message? Because the message is true for them, too, despite their resistance. 
For Hauerwas and Barth, “[t]he truth that makes Christians distinct is not a 
truth that is peculiar to them. It is not their truth but the truth for anyone.”28 
They both agree that the vocation of a Christian, which can take different forms 
in different social contexts, 
“implies a responsibility of every man and thus compels the Christian to see and 
understand not only himself but also the non-Christian in his responsibility, and to 
address him in terms of it.” The Christian, in other words, cannot address the non-
Christian on the basis of a general or human responsibility interpreted as the 
responsibility to conscience or to supposed or real orders and forces of the cosmos. 
Rather, every person is to be addressed as one who exists and stands in the light of 
Jesus Christ.
29
 
For Hauerwas, as for Barth, Christians must speak to the world out of the 
truth of the Gospel. Not every person believes in Jesus Christ, but Jesus Christ 
died and rose again for every person. That, I think, is the key both to 
Hauerwas’s resistance against and engagement with the world beyond the 
church. 
III 
TOWARD CRITERIA FOR A HAUERWASIAN ENGAGEMENT OF THE  
WORLD AND THE LAW OF THE WORLD 
According to Hauerwas, then, the primary task of Christian theology is not 
to recast its claims in the language of the secular world in general, or secular 
liberal democracy in particular, but confidently to proclaim the truth it bears in 
its own language—the language of Scripture and the church’s prayer-filled 
reflection on Scripture over the centuries. Given the primacy of the kerygmatic 
role of theology, for what reason—and on what basis—would it engage secular 
law? 
A.   Church and World 
Before we turn to these questions, some terminological clarification is 
necessary. What exactly does Hauerwas mean by “church”? And what, in his 
view, is its relationship to the “world”? Although they are terms Hauerwas uses 
frequently, he does not grace us with full explanations of their meaning in his 
Gifford Lectures. Both terms, of course, have long histories in Christian 
thought. Some (for example, Roman Catholics) frequently have used the term 
“church” to refer to the institutional structure of their religious community, 
 
 27.  Id. at 198 (quoting 4 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 3, second half, at 623 (G.W. 
Bromiley & T.F. Torrance. trans., 1961)). 
 28.  Id. at 200 (emphasis in original). 
 29.  Id. at 200–01 (quoting 4 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 3, second half, at 494 (G.W. 
Bromiley & T.F. Torrance. trans., 1961)). 
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which is deeply embedded in worldly structures. Others (for example, the 
American Puritans) have used it centrally to refer to the “elect”—those who 
have evidently been saved from eternal damnation by divine decree. Some 
Christian religious groups (for example, the Amish) have set up distinctive 
communities apart from the larger world, or with limited interaction with it (the 
Mennonites). Other Christians, such as Catholics and mainline Protestants, 
have not viewed faithfulness to the Gospel as requiring withdrawal from the 
world.30 
What about Hauerwas? Sorting through the full meaning and implications 
of his ecclesiology is not an easy task. Apparent tensions, if not outright 
contradictions, are easy to identify. Why, for example, does a theologian who 
emphasizes the distinctiveness of Christian claims and highlights the inimical 
nature of liberal democratic society to Christianity find himself in Time 
magazine as America’s best theologian?31 How can Hauerwas see both John 
Howard Yoder, a Mennonite, and Pope John Paul II as theological heroes, 
when they would have deep disagreements about morality (for example, the 
moral legitimacy of war), worship, and church membership (for example, the 
role of baptism)? He does not say. It is not clear, in other words, what robust 
definition of “church” he could offer that would encompass both men. While 
Hauerwas may on some level presuppose that there is a sociological group 
called “church,” in which both Yoder and John Paul II can be counted as 
members, he does not give us a way to identify that group, nor any reason for 
confidence that all its members will recognize one another as belonging to it. 
They may, of course, belong to the “invisible church” that will be gathered 
around Christ at the end of time. But what about a visible ecclesiology for here 
and now? 
I would like to propose that many of these definitional challenges can be 
ameliorated, if not resolved, by treating Hauerwas as largely working with a 
functionalist rather than an essentialist ecclesiology. I think that for Hauerwas, 
“church” points primarily to what we do—Christians give thanks to God in 
worship and witness to God’s saving activity in truth—rather than who we are. 
To put it another way, within his framework, “church” should be understood as 
more of a verb than a noun; it is a distinct activity, rather than a distinct 
membership group. If this is the case, then Hauerwas does not need to draw 
sharp boundaries between various branches of Christianity, labeling some true 
churches and some false. Both Yoder and John Paul II enact (rather than belong 
to) the one true church when and to the extent they are truly witnessing to the 
biblical story of salvation. 
Furthermore, by adopting a functionalist conception of church, Hauerwas 
does not need to act as a sectarian to sharply divide Christians from the world in 
 
 30.  Needless to say, sociologists of religion (for example, those operating with a Weberian 
“church”–“sect” distinction) would offer a different analysis of what the term “church” means than an 
ecclesiologist working within a particular religious tradition. 
 31.  Jean Bethke Elshtain, Christian Contrarian, TIME, Sept. 17, 2001, at 74. 
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every respect in order to preserve its distinctive message. Witnessing is an 
activity that can take place anywhere, as the account St. Paul’s witness to the 
Athenians evinces.32 Paul did not protect the Christian message from encounters 
with cosmopolitanism; in fact, he embraced such encounters. After preaching 
against idolatry in the marketplace (agora) and the synagogue, and debating 
Jews and Epicurean and Stoic philosophers, Paul was invited to speak at the 
Areopagus, a region of Athens on the Acropolis that at one time was comprised 
of temples, associated cultural activities and facilities, and the supreme 
Athenian council (their supreme court).33 There, Paul preached the Gospel 
message in terms the Athenians could understand, proclaiming to them that the 
“unknown God” they worshiped was in fact the God who would raise them 
from the dead. 
I suggest we think of the “world” in Hauerwasian terms as analogous to 
Athens, the agora, and the Aereopagus—as the locus of joint activity for all 
people, including those people who do not know that Jesus died for their sins. 
For Hauerwas, they are the people who need to hear the truth about 
themselves, which they can only do if Christians work and live and profess their 
faith in their midst. To the extent that Christians are incompletely converted—
and all Christians are that—they need to receive the same message. 
Moreover, interpreting the distinction between church and world in this 
functionalist rather than essentialist manner allows us to push Hauerwas’s 
framework constructively, in a way that may help clarify the relationship 
between two sets of terms that are key for our discussion. At times, it can 
appear that Hauerwas thinks the relationship between church and world is 
analogous to the relationship between theology and liberal democratic politics 
and philosophy: 
Church : World :: Theology : Liberal Democratic Political Philosophy 
Furthermore, it sometimes appears that Hauerwas is willing to turn these 
analogical relationships sideways, so the relationship between the church and 
theology, on the one hand, is analogous to that between the world and liberal 
democratic politics and philosophy: 
Church : Theology :: World : Liberal Democratic Political Philosophy 
Presuming that Hauerwas accepts the account of the relationship of the 
church to the world described above, he would do well to reject both analogies. 
The church’s fundamental role, in his view, is to witness to the world. The task 
of theology, however, is not to witness to liberal democratic political 
philosophy. Furthermore, flipping the analogy on its side entails even more 
relational distortions. The point of theology, as Hauerwas understands it, is to 
 
 32.  See Acts 17:22. 
 33.  According to biblical scholars, the Areopagus, the “hill of Ares,” was no longer the setting of 
the supreme Athenian council in Luke’s day. Luke meant that Paul was invited to a learned disputation 
in the former setting of the council, not subpoenaed to appear at a trial. See generally Richard J. Dillon, 
Acts of the Apostles, in THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 755 (Raymond E. Brown et al. 
eds., 1990). 
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help the church recover its kerygmatic voice. Theology’s task consists primarily 
of redescription of the web of Christian commitments, and secondarily, of 
offering critical, internal reflection on the current practices and challenges faced 
by the church. Liberal democratic political philosophy does not function in the 
same way for the world that theology (in Hauerwas’s view) does for the church. 
To suggest that it does is to make two mistakes: (1) it is to reduce the world to 
the American state, and (2) it is to assume the normative commitments of the 
American state are largely captured and reflected by liberal democratic political 
philosophy. 
But the world—the broader practices and activities in which Americans and 
others live their lives—includes far more than the apparatuses of the state. And 
liberal democratic philosophers are not philosopher kings, with the power to 
transform American society in the manner in which they wish to do. They sell 
their ideological wares in the agora and on the Areopagus, just like everyone 
else—including theologians. Religious language is far from on the wane in 
American political speech: Witness Rick Perry’s recent stadium-sized day of 
fasting and prayer,34 which echoes the day of fasts that New England Puritan 
divines held at the behest of the state in the seventeenth century in order to 
insure national prosperity through obedience to divine law.35 
The intricate web of state and federal law clearly and directly shapes the 
activity of the agora and the Areopagus—including the activity of political 
theorists. For example, it is in large part because of the Supreme Court’s broad 
interpretation of the First Amendment right to free speech that even radical 
denunciations of American policy are not generally suppressible or punishable 
as sedition. Precisely because it immediately and sometimes coercively 
influences behavior, the law has a far more direct role than academic political 
theory in expressing, shaping, and teaching the values of our political society. 
Political theorists of all stripes may make their proposals, but it is the 
lawmakers who make the ultimate dispositions. I do not deny that it is 
important for theologians to pay attention to the philosopher John Rawls’s 
account of the difference principle, which sketches the framework for a theory 
of distributive justice.36 It is equally if not more important, however, for them to 
examine the theory of distributive justice that is coercively implemented 
through the tax code. 
When most people think of legal norms, they think of the requirements and 
prohibitions of the criminal code. Lawyers know, however, that what the law 
enables and encourages, or impedes and discourages, is at least as important as 
what it straightforwardly requires or prohibits under the threat of penal 
sanctions. The law has a channeling function, highlighting certain activities as 
worthwhile (for example, home ownership), and marking clear paths that can 
 
 34.  See Manny Fernandez, Perry Leads Rally at Stadium for a ‘Nation in Crisis’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/politics/07prayer.html. 
 35.  See, e.g., HARRY S. STOUT, THE NEW ENGLAND SOUL (1986). 
 36.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60–83 (1971). 
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lead to achieving them. Much of the law curriculum, in fact, deals with bodies of 
law that are essentially positive in function: contract law, corporate law, 
property, and constitutional law are all meant to enable the orderly interaction 
of human beings with one another. As John Finnis has often said, a major point 
of the law is to solve “coordination problems”—not always to say “no,” but 
frequently to say “how” and “when” certain activities may take place.37 
Moreover, the web of law does not manifest, at either the state or federal 
level, the coherence of systematic political theory. Particularly in common-law 
countries such as the United States, the law is not like a suburban McMansion 
built all at once six months ago, but rather like an old farmhouse with additions 
and renovations from different periods clinging together in a rough and wary 
harmony. Liberal legal theory may be systematic, ahistorical, and thematically 
coherent; but the law of the United States of America—federal law and the law 
of the fifty states—most definitely is not.38 It is, to borrow from Jeffrey Stout’s 
borrowing from Claude Lévi-Strauss, a “bricolage.”39 We see coherence and 
functionality, but we also see tension, and sometimes even contradiction. We 
see development—or devolution—over time.40 This is particularly true of the 
common-law tradition, which grows over time as an accretion of decisions made 
in the context of particular cases. The common law does not entirely shuck off 
the past, but highlights some aspects while playing down others. 
I think Hauerwas’s own approach to theology, which eschews systematic 
reflection and places a high priority on narrative, would find a natural 
conversation partner in American case law. It is the compilation of narratives of 
actual controversies, which was settled by the judicial articulation of a 
governing rule “in the prism of the case.”41 Norm and narrative are interrelated 
in the common law; law students do not learn merely how to apply the rule to 
the facts, but also how to appeal to facts to argue that the rule in one case 
should not apply in a facially similar case. Methodologically speaking, in other 
words, the common-law tradition resonates greatly with the type of theology 
advocated and practiced by Hauerwas himself. It provides, in my view, a better 
point of contact for Hauerwasian theology with the agora and the Areopagus of 
America’s particular, historically conditioned liberal democracy than most work 
in liberal democratic theory. Let the systematic theologians talk to the 
systematic political theorists; theologians working in a Hauerwasian key will 
 
 37.  See the following works by John Finnis: INTENTION AND IDENTITY 85–86 (2011); NATURAL 
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 253–54 (1980); PHILOSOPHY OF LAW ch.3 (2011). 
 38.  See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW 
AND LAW SCHOOL (11th prtg. 2008) (1930) (providing an introduction to the messiness of legal 
reasoning). 
 39.  JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL 74–77 (1988). 
 40.  For example, enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was undermined by political factions 
and the actions of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 (1988). 
 41.  PAUL RAMSEY, NINE MODERN MORALISTS 195 (1962) (quoting EDMOND CAHN, THE SENSE 
OF INJUSTICE (1949) and EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION (1955)). 
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find a more congenial conversation partner in the common law. 
Thus far, I have made a case for Hauerwas’s engaging the common-law 
tradition in general as part of Christian theology’s engagement with the world. 
The next question pertains to the theological justification for such engagement: 
Why ought Hauerwas to consider it a legitimate endeavor, rather than a mere 
useless distraction from straightforward witnessing to the risen Christ? To 
address these questions, I think Hauerwas would do well to draw upon further 
resources from the thought of Karl Barth and Hans Frei, both of whom appear 
in his Gifford Lectures. 
More specifically, I would like to suggest that Hauerwas might justify his 
theological engagement with the world by drawing upon the framework with 
which Karl Barth organizes the relationship of God and humanity, as well as 
relationships of human beings to one another: the framework of covenant 
theology, which is a key aspect of the Reformed tradition in theology to which 
Barth belongs. Somewhat surprisingly, Hauerwas does not explicitly mention 
the covenantal aspect of Barth’s thought in his Gifford Lectures, although I 
think many of his remarks are consistent with its insights. 
B.   Creation and Covenant 
In general terms, covenant theology understands the relationship of God 
and humanity in terms of the exchange of solemn promises, repeatedly enacted 
in the Old Testament in the covenants between God and Adam and Eve, God 
and Noah (a renewed covenant for all humanity), and the covenant between 
God and Abraham (the covenant between God and the Jewish people). God 
freely chooses to make human beings his covenant partners, and confers upon 
humanity the power freely to accept his offer. Furthermore, in Jesus Christ, 
whom Christians believe to be both fully human and divine, humanity’s 
repeated breach of the covenant was decisively overcome by Christ’s fidelity, 
and obedience, to God’s call. 
Barth sees the creation—the entire created world—as the external basis of 
the covenant between God and humanity that is sealed by the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ, and the covenant as being the internal basis of 
creation. Barth writes, 
Creation comes first in the series of works of the triune God, and is thus the beginning 
of all the things distinct from God himself. Since it contains in itself the beginning of 
time, its historical reality eludes all historical observation and account, and can be 
expressed in the biblical creation narratives only in the form of pure saga. But 
according to this witness the purpose and therefore the meaning of creation is to make 
possible the history of God’s covenant with man which has its beginning, its centre and 
its culmination in Jesus Christ. The history of this covenant is as much the goal of 
creation as creation itself is the beginning of this history.
42
 
 
 
 42.  3 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, pt. 1, § 41, at 42 (G.W. Bromiley & T.F. Torrance 
trans., T&T Clark 2d ed. 2004) (1958). 
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To put it another way, according to Barth, God created the world for covenant 
partnership with him, a covenant partnership that was first enacted fully with 
the Jewish people and then expanded to encompass all humanity through the 
message of the Gospel. Consequently, theologians do not need to construct a 
bridge between the Christian community and the broader world, as if they are 
two distant bodies. The two are intertwined, because they were divinely 
oriented toward one another from the beginning. Nonetheless, the two do not 
have equal status in interpreting the terms of the relationship. The true meaning 
of creation, and its orientation toward covenant relationship with God, can be 
only identified from the perspective of those who acknowledge the saving 
activity of Jesus Christ. The directionality of the interpretation has to remain 
one-way. 
So a covenantal framework provides the theological basis for Hauerwas to 
allow the church to engage the world. What is the appropriate method of 
engagement? This is a difficult question. Christian theologians, according to 
both Barth and Hauerwas, cannot detach Christian claims from the biblical 
narrative in which their intelligibility rests; they therefore need to resist the 
futile endeavor to translate Christianity into other normative frameworks or 
systems. Both Hauerwas and Barth reject the project of natural theology as a 
comprehensive attempt to justify the belief in God on neutral philosophical or 
theological ground. Relatedly, they also reject a full-blown project of 
apologetics, understood as attempting to provide reasons not rooted in faith 
that are themselves sufficient to justify belief in Christianity. 
C.  Ad Hoc Correlations 
The fact that there are no well-paved, well-established highways between 
the church and the world does not mean there are no byways whatsoever. 
Theologians are free to make use of whatever intellectual or social material 
from the world—from the agora and the Areopagus—that helps them in their 
task of showing how the world is rightly known only from the perspective of the 
Christian story. As William Werpehowski argued, this task involves revealing 
how certain practices and patterns of activity engaged in by non-Christians are 
illuminated and assisted when set in the context of Christian claims. These 
efforts are not driven by intellectual system, but by context, need, and 
opportunity. They are, in Werpehowski’s term, “ad hoc apologetics”: 
The attempt to describe some feature of Christian faith in order to make it sensible 
and credible (i.e., “reasonable”) to a non-Christian must itself be expressive of the 
character of one who would stand faithfully in relationship with God in Christ. The 
substance, moreover, at least has to involve an appeal to the unbeliever that takes 
seriously his or her status as a creature of God, that is, as one whose own characteristic 
patterns of action and purpose bear some uneradicable relation to an origin in God. 
The Christian apologist thus seeks to establish common ground with the non-Christian 
as creature with reference to a particular context of action or a particular contested 
question or belief. That Christian identity is sustained thereby is what makes the 
apologetic theological. At the same time, the common ground sought and supportive 
of Christian identity also must be seen really to sustain and nurture the non-Christian 
in some particular area of belief or practice. The latter’s projects and purposes would 
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be advanced and would make more sense with the introduction of the theological 
factor securing the common ground. This is what makes the theological activity 
apologetic; reasonableness is displayed through conversation in a way that supports 
the non-Christian’s identity.
43
 
The project of ad hoc apologetics depends upon a broader, ad hoc account 
of theology’s correlation to secular disciplines in its working out of the Christian 
story of redemption. What does this account entail? According to Hans Frei, 
it argues that Christian theology is a nonsystematic combination of normed Christian 
self-description and method founded on general theory. But . . . it does not propose a 
correlation between heterogeneous equals. . . . [T]he practical discipline of Christian 
self-description governs and limits the applicability of general criteria of meaning in 
theology, rather than vice versa.
44
 
Although secular thought is frequently an aid to the task of Christian 
theology, theologians must guard against allowing the servant to become the 
master. 
Not surprisingly, Frei takes Barth as a prime example of the ad hoc 
correlationist approach. How does this approach relate to the Barthian account 
of the relationship between covenant and creation?45 In my view, it tacitly 
presupposes it. Since creation is the external basis of the covenant, theologians 
are free to make use of any intellectual tools they find in order to illuminate the 
Christian narrative, to make it more intelligible to persons within and outside 
the church. The history of Christianity is replete with fortuitous “borrowings” 
from secular thought in order to communicate truths rooted in the biblical 
narrative. The creeds themselves, for example, articulate the nature of God in 
the terms of Greek philosophy. One could argue that St. Paul himself engaged 
in ad hoc apologetics in his conversations on the Areopagus, showing the 
Athenians how his conception of their “unknown god” made more sense of 
their aspirations and purposes than their own religious beliefs did. 
The Reformed tradition of Christianity, from Calvin to Barth, has expressed 
great skepticism about the capacity of human wisdom to understand the truth of 
the human condition, due to the enduring effects of sin on the intellect as well 
as the will. Although relation can ameliorate those effects, it cannot eradicate 
them entirely. An ad hoc correlationist account is consistent with the 
heightened sense of epistemological limits in the Reformed tradition. Frei 
notes, “There can be no ultimate conflict between them [the truths of revelation 
and the truths of secular knowledge], but in finite existence and thought we 
cannot know how they fit together in principle.”46 The relationship of Christian 
doctrinal claims “to the broader or even universal linguistic or conceptual 
context within which they are generated remains only fragmentarily—perhaps 
 
 43.  William Werpehowski, Ad Hoc Apologetics, 66 J. RELIGION 282, 286–87 (1986) (emphasis in 
original). 
 44.  FREI, supra note 23, at 3–4. 
 45.  For a careful examination of Frei’s thought, see JASON A. SPRINGS, TOWARD A GENEROUS 
ORTHODOXY (2010). 
 46.  FREI, supra note 23, at 4. 
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at times negatively—specifiable; yet it is important to keep that relationship 
open and constantly restate doctrinal statements in the light of cultural and 
conceptual change.”47 
How do we situate Hauerwas with respect to Barth, Frei, and Werpehowski 
on an ad hoc correlationist approach to the disciplines of the word? In my view, 
Hauerwas has on occasion so emphasized the distinctiveness of Christian 
theological claims that he has led some readers to think that he would not admit 
the legitimacy of even an ad hoc correlation with secular disciplines. If this were 
in fact his opinion, then Hauerwas would have no legitimate point of contact 
from which to engage the world; he could simply preach to it in distinctively 
Christian terms and pray for its conversion. Yet I do not believe that this is in 
fact Hauerwas’s opinion. In his Gifford Lectures, Hauerwas has more fully 
integrated his approach with the Barthian approach of his teachers at Yale, 
particularly Hans Frei.48 In so doing, he has also, in my view, placed his 
engagement with the secular world and its disciplines on a firmer theoretical 
basis. 
IV 
CONVERGENCES BETWEEN A “PROTESTANT”  
NATURAL LAW AND THE COMMON LAW 
One more bridge needs to be crossed. Frei’s focus is dogmatic theology; he 
says comparatively little about questions of ethics. How should Christian 
theologians interested in appropriating an ad hoc correlationist methodology 
address applied questions of ethics and political theology? The Barthian notion 
of creation as the external basis of covenant would support the existence of a set 
of norms that is binding on all persons and communities simply by virtue of 
their basic human nature—which is created for redemption in Jesus Christ. Yet, 
at the same time, Barth’s insistence upon the primacy of the Christian narrative 
would reject both the legitimacy and effectiveness of any attempts to deduce 
these norms from universal first principles of morality. Both Barth and Frei 
would consider any attempt to formulate a neutral set of abstract moral 
principles that transcend Christianity and every other normative intellectual–
moral system to be both theologically mistaken and intellectually false. Finally, 
a Barthian approach to generally applicable moral norms would need to take 
into account the Reformed tradition’s insistence upon pervasive effects of 
original sin, which not only impedes the human ability to conform to true moral 
norms, but also and more fundamentally darkens our capacity to grasp those 
norms. 
Here, of course, we are verging into the complicated question of the 
relationship of the Protestant branch of Christianity to the natural-law tradition. 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  I am indebted to a conversation with Bill Werpehowski for crystalizing this point for me. 
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Some might ask, “What relationship?” To say categorically that all Protestants 
have always been opposed to natural-law methodology is a grave mistake. In 
the early modern period, Protestants did not reject “natural law” as providing a 
roughly workable basis for interactions in the secular world, although they 
denied that it could provide any kind of knowledge of morality sufficient for 
salvation. In fact, two of the fathers of international law, Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) 
and Samuel von Pufendorf (d. 1694), were Protestants. 
In the twentieth century, however, the situation was very different. Seared 
by the experience of the First World War, and appalled by the rise of the Third 
Reich, Barth rejected “natural law” as a sufficient basis to formulate a sound 
morality that would prevent Christians from committing, endorsing, or passively 
accepting atrocities.49 Moreover, in the United States in the first part of the 
twentieth century, many mainstream Protestant ethicists tended to associate 
natural law with the form it took in the Catholic neoscholastic tradition. In so 
doing, they assumed that natural law operated as a universally applicable and 
universally understandable set of moral norms that could be applied 
deductively and with certainty to an infinite range of factual circumstances. 
Protestant rejection of natural law became increasingly intertwined with its 
rejection of Catholic accounts of morality as too dependent upon unregenerate 
reason rather than Scripture. 
That rejection, however, provided an opportunity for rediscovery. In the 
mid-twentieth century, the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey groped toward a 
reconceptualization of the natural-law tradition that would allow Protestants to 
appropriate the tradition’s insights on their own terms. More specifically, in 
Nine Modern Moralists,50 Ramsey resists attempts to interpret the natural law in 
too rationalistic and deductivist a way. Instead, he draws upon Jacques 
Maritain’s understanding of the knowledge of natural law through inclination, 
through “connaturality,” not through pure, disembodied reason. In this schema, 
knowledge of the natural law no longer is a matter of reflecting upon essential human 
nature in abstraction from variable factual conditions and social relationships. 
Knowledge by connaturality, congeniality, inclination arises only vis-à-vis quite 
concrete conditions of fact. Judgments as to the fundamental law, quite as much as any 
other sort of law, are made only in medias res.
51
 
It seems to me that Ramsey’s account of natural law is congenial to the ad 
hoc correlationist approach suggested by the work of Barth and Frei. Moreover, 
I think it could furnish a platform for conversation between Hauerwas and the 
law, particularly the common law. In 1977, Hauerwas coauthored an article with 
David Burrell, entitled From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for 
Rationality in Ethics,52 which perceptively reflects on the relationship between 
 
 49.  For Barth’s debate on this topic with Emil Brunner, see EMIL BRUNNER & KARL BARTH, 
NATURAL THEOLOGY (2002). 
 50.  RAMSEY, supra note 41. 
 51.  Id. at 220. 
 52.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, RICHARD BONDI & DAVID BURRELL, TRUTHFULNESS AND 
TRAGEDY: FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS INTO CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1977). 
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norms, narrative, and character. Hauerwas and Burrell argue that “quandary 
ethics,” a genre of moral reasoning that applies abstract moral norms to 
stripped-down descriptions of controversial cases, are too abstract to reflect the 
richness and complexity of actual moral decisions.53 Although some might think 
the case-based reasoning in quandary ethics reflects the case-based approach in 
the common-law tradition, in fact, that is not so. Many key cases contain rich 
narratives, in which a legal norm is only understandable in light of the identity 
and character of the parties, as well as their broader social context. Very often, 
these narratives provide the basis not only for supporting the judgment of the 
court, but also for calling it into question, as the work of John T. Noonan, Jr. 
demonstrates.54 In my view, Ramsey’s retrieval and reformulation of a 
Protestant account of natural law is congenial to the insights of Hauerwas and 
Burrell, in part because it privileges the context-dependent, narrative-oriented 
approach of the common law as a locus for the articulation of moral norms. 
Ramsey developed his account of natural law in conversation not only with 
Maritain, a revisionist Catholic philosopher, but also with Edmond Cahn, a 
secular Jewish law professor. Drawing upon their insights, he struggled to 
formulate an historically embedded, inductive account of natural moral norms 
that could be identified “in the prism of the case,” and which were inextricably 
intertwined with both the cultural norms instantiating them and the facts of the 
particular controversy.55 There was, in Ramsey’s view, no way to strain and 
purify the natural law of these elements; one engaged the natural law in and 
through engaging its operations in cases and contexts. Of necessity, this 
engagement was always tentative and partial; another case could come along 
that could force revision or even abandonment of the principle articulated to 
decide the case. Hauerwas and Burrell would doubtless agree. 
Moreover, Ramsey does not want to separate inclination (which he 
identifies with natural law) from practical reason (which he identifies with 
human law, including the jus gentium). Nor does he want to separate inclination 
and natural law from their social embodiment. He sees “the straddle position” 
of jus gentium, containing “both characteristics which belong also to natural law 
(that is, known not only as rationally inferred but also through inclination), and 
characteristics that go beyond the content of natural law (that is, only rationally 
 
 53.  Id. at 15–39. 
 54.  See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, AND 
WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (2d ed. 2002). 
 55.  RAMSEY, supra note 41. In particular, see chapter eight, “Jacques Maritain and Edmond 
Cahn: The Egypt of the Natural Law,” and chapter nine, “Jacques Maritain and Edmond Cahn: Man’s 
Exodus from the Natural Law.” Ramsey was one of the first American Protestants to engage the 
Catholic tradition in an interested, appreciative, although critical way. Ramsey recognizes that Maritain 
is attempting to reject the rationalistic, deductivist account of natural law that he himself associates 
with Roman Catholicism. Ramsey does not, however, appreciate the variety in the Catholic tradition, 
although he does have an inkling that Aquinas himself is not subject to the criticisms he mounts. This 
book was written in the early 1960s; his interest and familiarity with Catholic moral theology grew over 
the next several decades. 
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inferred, and not known through inclination).”56 He asks rhetorically, 
Is the legislative decision against murder really strengthened or better understood 
when it is broken down as follows: “The prohibition of murder, insofar as this precept 
is known by inclination, belongs to natural law. The same prohibition of murder, if this 
precept is known as a conclusion inferred from a principle of natural law, pertains to 
jus gentium.” The judgment here being made is indivisibly tendential, decisional, and 
conceptual; it is at once natural and positive law.
57
 
Ramsey rejects the attempt to distill the natural law from its instantiations in 
the particularities of various societies and to separate it from the concrete, 
fallible decisions made by persons in those societies. This is precisely the reason 
he is open to the possibility that biblical morality has influenced the articulation 
of norms of justice that we now interpret as ecumenical or secular, rather than 
as specifically influenced by the biblical tradition. Here, Ramsey quotes Cahn: 
“The stubborn survival of some sort of faith in natural justice,” he [Cahn] wrote, 
“should point to a nucleus of truth.” The sense of injustice, knowledge through 
inclination, is that nucleus. “Judges may speak of ‘due process,’ ‘equal protection,’ 
‘general welfare,’ ‘reasonableness’—all somehow cleansed of natural rights or higher 
law. But would the decision be the same if twenty-four centuries had not preached an 
indwelling justice?”
58
 
Ramsey’s account of natural law both validates and challenges Hauerwas’s 
insistence that faithful commitment to the distinctive story of Christianity 
makes a difference to the identification and articulation of moral norms. For 
Ramsey, it has mattered that the basic norms of the Western legal tradition 
were formulated, implemented, and enforced by those committed to the salvific 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. It might have been otherwise, he 
concedes. But Ramsey would doubtless ask Hauerwas whether it would have 
been better otherwise, particularly for the weak and vulnerable. 
Furthermore, Ramsey incorporates a characteristically Protestant distrust of 
postlapsarian moral reason by emphasizing the fundamentally negative nature 
of natural moral knowledge: after the fall, human beings tend to have a sense of 
injustice—of what is wrong to do in concrete circumstances, not a full, positive 
sense of justice that could fully outline in advance the requirements for morally 
correct action in all situations. Accordingly, he highlights Maritain’s 
understanding of natural law as “knowledge through disinclination,” along with 
Cahn’s insistence that moral analysis should “focus not only on an act but an act 
of wrong” identified by “the sense of injustice.”59 
In Ramsey’s view, the common-law tradition also reflects the provisionality 
about specific judgments that accords with the Protestant sensibilities about the 
limitations of moral reasoning. He writes that “a possible Protestant view of the 
fundamental nature of moral and legal decisions based on natural justice (or 
 
 56.  Id. at 221 (emphasis in original). 
 57.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 58.  Id. at 226 (quoting EDMOND CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 11 (1949)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 59.  Id. at 224 (quoting EDMOND CAHN, RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN LAW 
11, 34 (1955)) (emphasis in original). 
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law) has a great deal in common with the jurisprudential understanding of 
judicial reasoning and moral decision in legal cases.”60 Key for Ramsey was the 
possibility of “unlimited discussion,” by which he meant that the conversation 
about the right way to resolve a particular case was never in principle closed, 
although the judicial decision settled the matter practically.61 His objection to 
the Catholic natural-law tradition has to do with its propensity, in his view, to 
use Church authority to shut down questions prematurely.62 
It seems to me that Hauerwas, committed as he is to the kerygmatic function 
of Christianity, ought to find Ramsey’s approach congenial. Although 
Hauerwas may be opposed to “Christendom,” he ought not to dismiss the 
efforts of Christians to discern, over the centuries, the concrete requirements of 
morality in particular cases and controversies, in light of the demands of justice, 
demands that are themselves shaped by the biblical narrative. It may or may not 
be true that the members of the contemporary bench, bar, and legal academy 
are irredeemably secularist. Nonetheless, in the Anglo–American common-law 
tradition, today’s legal minds must grapple with authoritative authors, sources, 
and subjects who were not secularists, but who were Christian believers—in 
fact, who were in the main Protestant Christians. The values and commitments 
of these earlier participants in the American legal tradition are embedded not 
only in the decisions, but also in the framing of the narratives of the particular 
cases and controversies that occasioned those decisions. 
Finally, I want to highlight the thoroughgoing narrativity of the common 
law, an idea toward which Ramsey is also groping, although he does not use the 
term. I have argued elsewhere that the common-law tradition can provide a 
particularly rich conversation partner for any theologian who takes Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s tradition theory seriously.63 Teaching first-year law students to 
think like lawyers means helping them to appropriate four features of tradition-
constituted inquiry, which include (1) the interdependent relationship of rules 
and facts in common-law cases, (2) the importance of understanding the 
foundational narratives of the subject matter, (3) the need to move beyond both 
skepticism about legal reasoning and the quest for an unattainable certainty 
about the law, and (4) the role of authority in the development of the law.64 
The characteristic method of teaching law students is the “case method.” 
Students learn the law by reading “casebooks” that present key doctrines in the 
context of the key cases that pressed the court to articulate or revise those 
doctrines. These cases are stories. They function in the system of legal 
 
 60.  Id. at 213. 
 61.  “The first distinctive feature of Protestant doctrines of the law of nature—though not only of 
Protestantism—is the separation of the natural law from the context of the authority of ecclesiastical 
positive law so that the inherent meaning of natural law might come to fulfillment in the progressive 
discovery of new and relevant truth through unlimited discussion.” Id. at 229. 
 62.  Id. at 213. 
 63.  M. Cathleen Kaveny, Between Example and Doctrine: Contract Law and Common Morality, 33 
J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 669, 684–85 (2005). 
 64.  Id. at 676. 
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education in much the same way that Bible stories function in religious 
education, or fairy tales function in the more general process of socializing a 
child. Through these stories, law students learn not just what the rules are, but 
who the characteristic characters are, and what the characteristic plot lines are, 
in the moral universe instantiated by the common-law subject in question.65 By 
reading cases, law students learn to know the characteristic narratives well 
enough to “absorb the world into the text,” to borrow the description of a pre- 
and post-critical way of making use of the biblical narrative proposed by 
postliberal theologians such as Hans Frei and George Lindbeck.66 They can, in 
other words, begin trying to fit new scenarios into the normative worldview 
intricately woven by the legal cases. 
The realm of the common law, of course, is vast. Where in particular might 
Hauerwas begin his engagement? I would like to end this section by suggesting 
that the common law of contracts would be a particularly auspicious place for 
Hauerwas to begin engaging the American legal tradition, for at least two broad 
sets of reasons, which I hope to explore more fully in the future. 
First, there is considerable historical and conceptual overlap in the 
development of the theological and legal ideas of covenant and contract. As I 
noted above, Karl Barth is a covenant theologian; he draws upon the repeated 
imagery of God’s agreements with humanity in Scripture to provide his 
theological framework. He was not the first one to take this approach. 
Although Christian theologians had always paid due regard to the concept, it 
assumed a more central role in the thought of John Calvin (d. 1564) and grew to 
provide the organizing motif of some groups of his followers. Originating in 
Germany, covenant theology (sometimes called federal theology; the Latin 
word foedus is often translated as “pact”) received fulsome development at the 
hands of the English and American Puritans in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In developing their covenant theologies in sermons and religious 
tracts, the Puritans (who belonged to the emerging merchant class) tended to 
draw upon law knowledge of the nature of binding legal agreements in order to 
make their point. They tended, in fact, to use the terms “contract” and 
 
 65.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 201 (1981) (“[M]an is in his actions and practice, 
as well in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his 
history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own 
authorship; I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of 
what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ We enter human society, that is, with one or more 
imputed characters—roles into which we have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in 
order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be 
construed. It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children, good but misguided 
kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who receive no inheritance but must make their own 
way in the world and eldest sons who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live 
with the swine, that children learn or mislearn both what a child is and what a parent is, what the cast of 
characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what the ways of the world are.”). 
 66.  HANS FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE (1974); GEORGE A. LINDBECK, THE 
NATURE OF DOCTRINE (1984). 
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“covenant” interchangeably—as did many non-technical legal discussions.67 
Second, turning to the contemporary era, it seems to me that the norms 
embedded in and illustrated by the cases of contract law would bear fruitful 
consideration by Christian ethicists, particularly those of a narrative bent. 
Narrative theology, for example, would not limit its moral evaluation of 
promise-making and promise-keeping to the moment of commitment, but 
would instead view that obligation in a broad temporal frame that relates past, 
present, and future. So does contract law, especially through the concept of 
reliance. Promissory estoppel, for example, centrally enforces unbargained-for 
promises upon which the promisee has relied to his or her detriment, either by 
making further commitments (for example, going into debt upon the promise of 
a forthcoming payment) or by forgoing other opportunities (for example, 
relying on the promise of one job by declining another offer). 
Reflecting upon the legal concept of reliance might also allow Christian 
ethicists more firmly to situate individual actions in a communal context for 
purposes of evaluating their moral import, particularly with respect to the 
potential for vulnerability they create. For example, promise-making is 
essentially a social act, as the institution of marriage suggests. Each spouse 
relies upon the other’s promises in the joint expression of their positive 
freedom, creating a family together. Embarking upon that project, however, 
renders them far more vulnerable than they were before making or accepting 
the reciprocal promises of marriage. Women and men who are responsible for 
small children are not as free, flexible, and able to protect themselves 
financially as they were before those children came along. Reliance upon their 
mutual promises makes the two partners vulnerable; one purpose of treating 
those promises as legally binding is to protect them against the potential 
wounds. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that it is possible to articulate a theological basis for a 
Hauerwasian engagement with the law. That basis consists of three elements: 
(1) a Barthian understanding of the relationship of creation and covenant; (2) a 
general ad hoc correlationist methodology; and (3) a conviction that the moral 
norms of creation (natural law) appear through a glass darkly, inextricably 
entwined with cultural norms and particular facts and circumstances. Moreover, 
I think the common law can provide a particularly rich conversation partner not 
only for Hauerwas, but also for any theologian who takes Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
tradition theory seriously. In particular, I think the common-law subject of 
contracts—of the law surrounding enforceable promises—would be a good 
conversational starting point, for reasons both historical and normative. 
 
 67.  DAVID ZARET, THE HEAVENLY CONTRACT: IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN PRE-
REVOLUTIONARY PURITANISM 168 (1985). 
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Historically, the tradition of covenant theology, in which Karl Barth 
participates, drew heavily upon images from widely known legal discourse 
pertaining to promise-keeping and debt in working out its understanding of the 
relationship of God and humanity.68 Normatively, Christians are centrally a 
people who have learned what it is to rely upon a promise—the divine promise 
that we are, and will always be, God’s people. Relying on God’s promise, 
Christians try to become reliable ourselves. A conversation about what 
communal and individual habits and practices are necessary to encourage us to 
be persons who can rely upon one another’s promises is something about which 
contract law and covenant theology have a great deal to say. 
So, in my view, does Stanley Hauerwas. 
 
 
 68.  See id. (entire work). 
